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Abstract. During the entire procedure of risk assessment
for hydrologic hazards, the selection of consistent and reli-
able scenarios, constructed in a strictly systematic way, is
fundamental for the quality and reproducibility of the re-
sults. However, subjective assumptions on relevant impact
variables such as sediment transport intensity on the sys-
tem loading side and weak point response mechanisms re-
peatedly cause biases in the results, and consequently affect
transparency and required quality standards. Furthermore,
the system response of mitigation measures to extreme event
loadings represents another key variable in hazard assess-
ment, aswellastheintegralriskmanagementincludinginter-
vention planning. Formative Scenario Analysis, as a supple-
ment to conventional risk assessment methods, is a technique
to construct well-deﬁned sets of assumptions to gain insight
into a speciﬁc case and the potential system behaviour. By
twocasestudies, carriedout(1)toanalysesedimenttransport
dynamics in a torrent section equipped with control mea-
sures, and (2) to identify hazards induced by woody debris
transport at hydraulic weak points, the applicability of the
Formative Scenario Analysis technique is presented. It is ar-
gued that during scenario planning in general and with re-
spect to integral risk management in particular, Formative
Scenario Analysis allows for the development of reliable and
reproducible scenarios in order to design more speciﬁcally
an application framework for the sustainable assessment of
natural hazards impact. The overall aim is to optimise the
hazard mapping and zoning procedure by methodologically
integrating quantitative and qualitative knowledge.
Correspondence to: B. Mazzorana
(bruno.mazzorana@provincia.bz.it)
1 Introduction
In European mountain regions considerable losses result-
ing from torrent processes occurred during the last decades
(e.g., Oberndorfer et al., 2007; Autonome Provinz Bozen-
S¨ udtirol, 2008) in spite of considerable efforts undertaken
for the protection of endangered areas (Fuchs and McAlpin,
2005; Oberndorfer et al., 2007). It is not only an economic
challenge and a political mission to deﬁne an optimal protec-
tion level against natural hazards, but also a societal desire
to guarantee rural development in alpine regions. Therefore,
decision makers have to deal with issues of excessive land-
use pressure and ecological and economic viability, which
is an often complex and interlinked task. One major contri-
bution towards this direction is the attempt to control land-
use by reducing vulnerability on the basis of hazard and risk
maps (Fuchs et al., 2007, 2009), as recently laid down in the
European Flood Risk Directive (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2007). Hazard maps indicate, for deﬁned
returnperiodsoftheunderlyingdesignevents, thespatialdis-
tribution of classes of maximum process intensities. Risk
maps result by intersecting these hazard maps with values at
risk exposed. Despite the long tradition of hazard mapping in
several European mountain regions, a retrospective analysis
on hazard maps highlighted a series of shortcomings, above
all with respect to the magnitude (and frequency) of torrent
processes (Berger et al., 2007; Autonome Provinz Bozen-
S¨ udtirol, 2008).
At the watershed scale, the magnitude of channel-based
hazard processes is often expressed by the measured geo-
morphic features, such as potential debris volume, mean ﬂow
velocity, peak discharge, and runout distance (Fuchs et al.,
2008). For this purpose, empirical and semi-empirical equa-
tions may be used. As an alternative dynamic (often numer-
ical) simulation models might be considered to assess the
ﬂow properties and the depositional behaviour. However, in
particular the effects of changing channel morphology and
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Fig. 1. Scenario Trumpet indicating ﬁve identiﬁed possible out-
comes of a system to be analysed.
associated woody debris transport phenomena were found to
amplify process intensities considerably (e.g., Diehl, 1997;
Lyn et al., 2007), which is not taken into account sufﬁciently
by the respective models. Furthermore, facing recent events
existing hazard maps turned out to be not as reliable as ex-
pected (e.g., Bezzola and Hegg, 2007). Consequently, sub-
sequent risk reduction measures did not necessarily provide
the most efﬁcient management strategy and therefore the im-
plemented solutions were only suboptimal. In order to im-
prove risk analyses and to support decision making, above
all underlying scenarios have to be re-deﬁned based on these
issues, in particular with respect to sources of uncertainty
affecting the predictability of hazardous phenomena (e.g.,
Pat´ e-Cornell, 1996; Merz et al., 2008). As outlined by Fuchs
et al. (2008) and Mazzorana and Fuchs (2009), such uncer-
tainties include with respect to hydrological hazards and tor-
rent processes
1. uncertainties about the possible range of rheological be-
haviour and about the liquid-solid mixture concentra-
tion of debris ﬂows;
2. uncertainties in system loading assumptions (e.g.,
duration-intensityrelateduncertainties, uncertaintiesre-
lated to sediment transport rates, uncertainties emerging
from woody debris transport);
3. uncertainties in system response mechanisms (e.g., lo-
calised obstructions that divert the ﬂow patterns, inﬂu-
ence of small-scale topological features);
4. uncertainties concerning the protection system func-
tionality and mitigation reliability (e.g., failure propen-
sities of key components within the protection system,
sediment dosing behaviour of retention basins, dike fail-
ures); and
5. uncertaintiesconcerningmorphologicalchangesthatin-
duce hazard processes or amplify their disposition (e.g.,
erosion phenomena in alluvial channels or on alluvial
fans, and ﬂow path changes in steep mountain rivers).
Commonly used 2-D-simulation models with limited com-
putation capabilities for movable bed (e.g., only deposition
processes are simulated) are only partially capable to take
into account hazards induced by morphological changes. Sit-
uations when the torrent diverges through lateral erosion pro-
cesses from the originally incised channel forms are not fully
detected and the consequent propagation patterns are there-
fore not identiﬁed (for a comparison, see e.g. ETAlp Consor-
tium, 2003; Rickenmann et al., 2006).
In the procedures and regulations actually being used in
hazard mapping it is discretionary to the experts to subjec-
tively set limits to some of the above-mentioned uncertain-
ties, interestingly and ﬁttingly through expertise and by ex-
pert knowledge. This methodological gap represents a pos-
sible source of controversies during the process of manda-
tory audit of the preliminary hazard maps by administrative
bodies and affected stakeholders with legal standing, which
might result in additional work and consequently increased
expenditures.
A reliable and efﬁcient procedure that allows for the
above-mentioned factors of uncertainty is to conduct a par-
ticipative scenario analysis. This analysis allows for a multi-
disciplinary approach merging results derived by different
analysis tools such as estimates, empirical and numerical
simulation models, and event documentation. By participa-
tive scenario analyses, a set of consistent scenarios is iden-
tiﬁed by a team of specialists. The identiﬁed scenarios con-
tribute to the robustness of the entire hazard zoning proce-
dure as a basis for risk assessment. As a result, derived
products, such as intervention plans, beneﬁt from this fully
coherent derivation procedure. In order to meet these aims,
a Formative Scenario Analysis approach (Scholz and Tietje,
2002) was chosen to identify sources of uncertainty result-
ing from the assessment of hydrologic hazards. Following
Scholz and Tietje (2002), Formative Scenario Analysis is a
technique to construct well-deﬁned sets of assumptions to
gain insight into a system and its potential development.
2 Background – exploring alternative developments
through scenarios
Scenarios are constructed for the purpose of focusing atten-
tion on causal processes and decisive points. A scenario is
a plausible image of a possible future system state, hence
a fundamental premise on which scenario planning is based
is the uncertain predictability of the future. Figure 1 shows
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Figure 2. Toppling of a series of consolidation structures  
Fig. 2. Toppling of a series of consolidation structures.
the scenario trumpet metaphor, where the starting point of
scenario analysis is t0 and all possible future states of the
system are represented within the trumpet. While the upper
margin identiﬁes the most optimistic case (XE1), the lower
margin represents the most pessimistic one (XE2). This rep-
resentation of possible multiple futures takes into account ei-
ther deviations from an undisturbed evolution (midline of the
trumpet) or other disturbances at t1 that would change a hy-
pothetic trajectory to XB to the future state XC or a failure
event at t2 that would lead to the ﬁnal state XD. As shown in
Fig. 2 (toppling of a series of consolidation dams), the con-
sideration of disturbances is an indispensable requirement if
debris ﬂow phenomena are analysed. However, as O’Brien
and Dyson (2007) pointed out, one single scenario provides
only one possible view of the future state of a system and
takes therefore uncertainty not sufﬁciently into account.
Conversely, scenario planning is an approach to develop
sets of scenarios that therefore provide a number of possible
future states of a system. Scenarios can be classiﬁed fol-
lowing the topology proposed by Ducot and Lubben (1980)
according to three different axes (see Fig. 3):
1. The causal nature of the scenario (vertical axis). At
one pole exploratory scenarios are situated, where ef-
fects are projected given an initial set of causes. At the
opposite pole anticipatory scenarios are located which
offer explanations of possible causes given an initial set
of effects. With respect to torrent processes, an exam-
ple of an exploratory scenario is the determination of
the liquid and solid discharge at the downstream end of
a reach with consolidation control structures gives the
liquid and solid discharges at the upstream boundary.
Exploratory scenario
(Effects given a specific set of causes)
Anticipatory scenario
(Offers explanations of
possible causes given a set of effects)
Normative
(Incorporates values of
person using scenario)
Descriptive
(Ordered set of possible
occurrences irrespective 
of desirability)
Time
(Cross-sectional
or peripheral)
Time
(Trend)
Fig. 3. Ways to classify different scenarios.
Key variables determining the output of the considered
system are, among others, the performance of the pro-
tection system, potential landslides adding a certain vol-
ume of solids to the system, and the stability of the tor-
rent bed and bank slopes. Without very detailed infor-
mation about these key variables, only a scenario set
projection gives insight into the system dynamics. Typ-
ical anticipatory scenarios include analyses of particu-
lar damage conﬁgurations in consequence of extreme
events. During scenario identiﬁcation, specialists in-
tegrate the available quantitative knowledge (e.g. rain-
fall data and precipitation distribution) and qualitative
knowledge (e.g. silent witnesses, interviews with af-
fected citizens) in order to plausibly reconstruct the dy-
namics of the event.
2. The existing normative and descriptive relationships be-
tween scenarios are represented by the horizontal axis.
The descriptive scenario states an ordered set of possi-
ble occurrences regardless of the desirability of the out-
comes. Normative scenarios conversely are those which
incorporate values, concerns and interests of the devel-
oper or consumer of the scenario. In natural hazard risk
management the focus is either on descriptive scenar-
ios, namely on the determination of an ordered set of
possible incidences given a particular situation, or on
normative scenarios when the performance of a planned
protection system is deﬁned.
3. The temporal dimension is represented by the inclined
axis, and a distinction is made between trends and pe-
ripheral scenarios. Trends or timeline scenarios repre-
sent hazardous events in a causally related manner to
provide explanations of how relevant factors evolve in
time (e.g. the temperature evolution within the next 20
years). Conversely, aperipheraloracross-sectionalsce-
nario represents a description of a particular future point
in time.
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Table 1. The four main applications of scenarios.
Unique problem solving Multiple problem solving
Open up exploration Making sense (risk assessments) Anticipation (strategy evaluation)
Closure – decisions Developing strategy (strategy development) Adaptive organisational learning (skills)
Scenario analysis started to become a major tool particularly
in the ﬁeld of management, economics and environmental
decision making after the publication of the works of Kahn
and Wiener (1967). Determinant reasons for the growing
attention paid to scenario analyses were the drawbacks and
pitfalls of a relevant number of deterministic environmental,
economic or ecological forecasting models. Yielding only
individual predictions and not adequately including qualita-
tivesystemchanges(disruptions, Godet, 2000), deterministic
models were found to be only partially useful when trying to
predict future states of complex systems. If a sediment dos-
ing system, typically composed of an approaching reach, a
deposition basin, an open check dam and an outlet reach is
considered, the evolution of the channel bed level in the re-
tention basin during either the increasing or the decreasing
part of the hydrograph can be accurately and precisely pre-
dicted by deterministic models (Armanini and Larcher, 2001;
Miyazawa et al., 2003; Remaˆ ıtre et al., 2008). However, the
simultaneous presence of woody debris transport phenomena
obstructing the openings (e.g. slits) of the check dam inter-
fere signiﬁcantly with the evolution of the torrent bed, lead-
ing to an – at least partially – invalidation of the prediction
resulting from the deterministic model. To overcome these
restrictions in predictability, the identiﬁcation of small num-
bers of scenarios which represent different future states of a
system is needed. It is possible, through a reliable scenario
analysis, to re-perceive an image of reality, and to enhance
individual engagement, commitment and mental ﬂexibility
in order to develop best reply strategies (Scholz and Tietje,
2002; Tietje, 2005). In Table 1, the four main applications
of scenarios with respect to natural hazard risk management
are shown. Apart from the overall goal to assess risk, the
development and evaluation of strategies as well as adap-
tive organisational learning became increasingly important
for public bodies involved in dealing with natural hazards in
Europe.
From a formal perspective scenario analysis can be clas-
siﬁed into three different types, (1) holistic scenario analy-
sis, (2) model scenario analysis, and (3) Formative Scenario
Analysis. A holistic scenario analysis (which is analogue to
theelicitationofresponsesfromexperthearings)includesthe
construction of scenarios based on the opinion of specialists
from the individual disciplines involved. A subjective men-
talintegrationofinterdisciplinaryqualitativeandquantitative
knowledge takes place, and intuitions and formal analyses of
experts are combined (see e.g. Kahn and Wiener, 1967; van
der Heijden, 2005). In doing so, mathematical methods, ex-
perimental results and individual local knowledge are used to
reﬁne certain aspects of these scenarios.
Model scenario analyses are mainly based on (not always
dynamical) systems modelling. By systematically varying
the unknowns and assuming different values for uncertain
parameters, the model is forced to create a number of trajec-
tories, some of which are subsequently selected as scenarios
by the expert pool.
Following Scholz and Tietje (2002), Formative Scenario
Analysis is a method to construct well-deﬁned sets of as-
sumptions to gain insight into a system and its potential de-
velopment. With this procedure the study team is guided
towards a differentiated and structured understanding of the
current state and dynamics of a system. It is usually per-
formed by small groups with specialised expertise about dif-
ferent aspects of the system, which they share with one an-
other. Hence, Formative Scenario Analysis is based on qual-
itatively assessed impact factors. Experts determine by a
rating procedure quantitative relations between these fac-
tors. Basically a Formative Scenario Analysis consists of
two steps, (1) analytic modelling and decomposition of the
initial state of the case studied, and (2) formative synthe-
sis. In the ﬁrst step an expert team identiﬁes a set of key
impact factors or variables that serve as preceptors. In the
second step of formative synthesis, various operations are
carried out on these impact variables in order to generate
all possible scenarios. Subsequently, a consistency analy-
sis is performed in order to identify a number of different
but internally consistent scenarios. A scenario interpretation
phase reﬁnes this procedure to iteratively identify relevant
settings. This methodology was proposed by Scholz and Ti-
etje (2002) by application of a nine-step Formative Scenario
Analysis (see Fig. 4). Firstly, the specialised team of ex-
perts precisely deﬁnes the case study to be investigated, re-
sulting in a conceptual sketch and a concise description of
the problem to be assessed (steps 1 and 2). Secondly, the
expert team identiﬁes the broad set of impact variables or
impact factors that possibly determine the actual state of the
studied system and the expected future developments (step
3). Thirdly, the relative importance of the key variables is
estimated; based on this rating the case study is structured by
an impact matrix (step 4). This impact matrix provides activ-
ity, passivity, impact strengths and involvement measures for
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each variable (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). Activity quantiﬁes
the effectiveness of the impact of a variable on other vari-
ables. Passivity (or sensitivity) is correlated with the medium
dependency of a variable on other variables. Impact strength
is a summarising indicator of the medium impact strength of
a variable on the entire case studied. Involvement indicates
how strongly a certain variable is interlinked with the system.
Forthly, a grid of activity and passivity scores supports the
expert team in selecting the core set of relevant key variables
that are supposed to be most important within the studied
system (step 5). The classical Formative Scenario Analysis
subsequently applies the MIC-MAC Analysis (Cross Impact
Matrix-Multiplication Applied to Classiﬁcation, step 6). The
scenario construction phase (step 7) is of crucial importance
for the subsequent consistency analysis (step 8). Scenario in-
terpretation completes the Formative Scenario Analysis (step
9). With respect to hydraulic risk management, two essen-
tial criteria for scenario selection were identiﬁed, (1) consis-
tency, since inconsistent scenarios draw no realistic image of
the system development, (2) difference between scenarios,
since decision makers focus on a set of principally possible
system developments, while small differences between simi-
lar scenarios are of minor importance. With respect to com-
mon hazard zoning procedures, Formative Scenario Analy-
sis provides input data for modelling, contributing for ex-
ample to a retraceable and reproducible explanation of the
assumed system loading conditions (e.g., deﬁnition of pro-
cess types and corresponding solid and liquid discharge hy-
drographs). Moreover, possible systems behaviour at weak
points (e.g., log jam at bridge cross sections) can be qual-
itatively assessed and subsequently considered in the simu-
lations. Furthermore, scenarios provide an integrated fram-
ing approach (backward planning) ensuring the adjustment
of scenario data and modelling results and facilitate their val-
idation.
3 Method
As a reference the nine steps Formative Scenario Analysis
procedure described above is followed. Outlining succinctly
the method it is referred to (1) a failure propensity case in an
alpine torrent reach with a relevant number of consolidation
protection measures (compare also with Fig. 2) and to (2)
woody debris transport hazard scenarios at hydraulic weak
points. ThekeystepsofFormativeScenarioAnalysisapplied
were the following:
1. The expert team listed di,i=1,...,N impact variables,
also referred to as system variables, impact factors or
case descriptors.
2. For each individual impact variable the expert team as-
sessed the mutual impacts between the variables di and
dj (i,j=1,...,N;i6=j). To account for the relative im-
portance of each individual impact variable on the entire
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Step 9: Scenario
interpretation
Step 1: System definition
Step 4: Impact matrix
Step 5: System grid and
system graph
Step 6: MIC-MAC analysis
Step 7: Scenario
construction
Step 8: Consistency analysis
and selection of scenarios
Step 3: Impact variables
Step 2: System properties
 
Figure 4. The nine steps of Formative Scenario Analysis  
Fig. 4. The nine steps of Formative Scenario Analysis.
system studied, qualitative and quantitative knowledge
integration is essential. Only the identiﬁed key variables
were included in the ﬁnal set of selected impact factors.
Since, with respect to hydrologic hazards, considerable
scientiﬁc evidence exists for such variables, the speciﬁc
information content was directly taken into considera-
tion.
3. The expert team subsequently constructed the impact
matrix, in which mutual impacts, ai,j, between the vari-
ables di and dj were rated on the basis of three levels:
0=no or very little impact; 1=medium impact; 2=high
impact. The impact matrix can be formally written as
A=
 
ai,j

,i,j=1,...,N and is shown in extended form
as follows:
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Activity
N P
j=1
a1,j and passivity
N P
i=1
ai,1 for each variable
were calculated, and mean activity and mean passiv-
ity was obtained by the arithmetic mean of the activ-
ity and passivity of each key variable. The comparison
of the activity of a variable with mean activity, and of
the passivity of a variable with mean passivity allowed
for categorising the variables into active, passive, am-
bivalent and buffer variables making use of the system
grid representation (compare case studies presented in
Sects. 4.1 and 4.2). A variable is considered to be active
ifitsactivityisabovetheaverageactivityofallvariables
and its passivity is smaller than the average passivity of
all variables. A variable is considered to be passive if
the activity is below the average activity and its passiv-
ity is larger than the average passivity of all variables.
A variable is considered to be ambivalent if its activ-
ity is above the average activity of all variables and its
passivity is larger than the average passivity of all vari-
ables. A variable is considered to be a buffer variable if
its activity is below the average activity of all variables
and its passivity is smaller than the average passivity of
all variables.
4. In a next step, the group of experts deﬁned the levels of
impact variables for each individual key variable. Since
the combinatorial number of scenarios is considerably
inﬂuenced by the number of levels deﬁned for each
impact variable, impact factors and their levels should
be deﬁned parsimoniously (Scholz and Tietje, 2002).
Each impact variable di required the deﬁnition of at
least two discrete levels (Ni≥2) which were denoted by
d1
i ,d2
i ,...,d
Ni
i .
5. Formally a scenario was a vector
Sk=
 
d
n1
i ,...,d
ni
i ,...,d
nN
N

with k=1,...,k0; the
number of scenarios was k0 =
N Q
i=1
Ni.
6. The next step included the construction of the
consistency matrix C=
h
c

d
ni
i ,d
nj
j
i
which
contained the consistency ratings, c(·,·), for
all pairs of impact variables at all levels c,  
i,j=1,...,N,i6=j,ni=1,...,Ni,nj=1,...,Nj

(for an application of criteria for consistency ratings
see Sects. 4.1 and 4.2).
7. For each scenario a consistency value was calculated
as additive measure as c∗ (Sk)=
P
c

d
ni
i ,d
nj
j

with
i,j=1,...,N,i6=j,d
ni
i ,d
nj
j ∈Sk.
8. The scenario selection was based conjointly on
the consistency value of the scenarios and the
difference between them. As proposed by Ti-
etje (2005) the distance measure 1 corresponded
to the number of differences between the scenarios
1(Sk,Sl)=
n P
i=1

1 if di (Sk)6=di (Sl)
0 otherwise . The scenarios
wererankeddecreasinglyaccordingtoconsistencyinan
array. The scenario with the highest consistency value
Sk was selected from the array and compared with the
second scenario Sl. If 1(Sk,Sl) was sufﬁciently high,
e.g. 1(Sk,Sl)≥1∗, where 1∗ was a chosen threshold
value, thenscenarioSl wasalsoselectedandbecomethe
new comparison reference for scenario three, otherwise
the third scenario was compared with the ﬁrst scenario,
etc.
9. Scenario interpretation completed the Formative Sce-
nario Analysis.
4 Applications and results
In this section two case studies, (1) the analysis of sediment
transport dynamics in a torrent reach with a series of consol-
idation works and (2) the identiﬁcation of hazards induced
by woody debris transport at hydraulic weak points, are pre-
sented. Characteristics of both case studies include the need
to combine knowledge from well-deﬁned research sectors in
order to determine the factors that could signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ence the current state of each system and the underlying dy-
namics. In the ﬁrst application (4.1), a synopsis of the main
ﬁndingsaboutissuesrelatedtosedimenttransportandaqual-
itative understanding of protection system responses in terms
of reliability and feedback loop effects on sediment transport
intensity is required. In the second case study (4.2), a knowl-
edge integration of woody debris recruitment and transport
phenomena and the caused interactions (e.g. obstruction) at
hydraulic weak points (e.g. bridge locations) is indispens-
able. Therefore, an interdisciplinary study team with experts
of the required knowledge domains (e.g. hydraulics, sedi-
ment and woody debris transport, structural reliability, sys-
tem dynamics) had been formed.
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WE  1.5 2  3  4.5 2.6 8.5 9  10  Re-discussion Re-discussion 
FI  1.7 2.4 3.2 4.5 2.4 4  4.5 5  Re-discussion Re-discussion 
Fig. 5. Pre-selection of possible impact factors or key variables relevant for case study 1.
4.1 Case study one: failure propensity case in an Alpine
torrent and possible effects on sediment transport at the
downstream outﬂow cross section
The study team, familiar with the test site, deﬁned the sys-
tem to be analysed (steps 1 and 2 of FSA) and assessed in
an exploratory investigation step the set of impact variables
that presumably could have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the cur-
rent state of the dynamics of the system. The case was ﬁrst
decomposed by the study team and analysed by means of
different preceptors, e.g. condition monitoring of the protec-
tion system, event documentation and topographic surveys,
available hydrodynamic simulations, as well as geological
and geotechnical expertises. The following synthesis step
(step 3 of FSA) lead to a new conception of the case with
the identiﬁcation of relevant impact factors and their inter-
action. A pre-selection of possible impact factors is shown
in Fig. 5. It was assumed that at the upstream boundary of
the analysed liquid discharge of the torrent reach and the in-
ﬂow rate of sediment had to be taken into consideration. As
a consequence, two impact factors, hydro inﬂow [HI] and
sediment inﬂow [SI] were deﬁned. Reliability of the pro-
tection system components was judged to play an essential
role in releasing signiﬁcant amounts of sediment in case of
a protection system failure. Consequently, an additional im-
pact factor, the reliability of the protection system [PSR] was
identiﬁed. The study team pointed out that the forest cover
[FC] could have a regulating effect on sediment availabil-
ity in the system [SSA]. The ratio between deposition and
erosion [ED] on the one hand and the retention capacity of
the system [SRC] completed the picture of impact factors
that inﬂuence the solid transport intensity at the downstream
boundary, considered within the model by the impact factor
variation of solid outﬂow [VSO]. In a second consultation,
after having judged that (1) hydro inﬂow [HI] and solid in-
ﬂow [SI] could be considered together as a new key variable
solid/liquid input [SLIT], (2) the forest cover [FC] is not con-
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Fig. 6. System grid of the activity and passivity scores for case
study 1.
sidered to be essential and (3) the availability of sediment in
the system [SSA] incorporates to a certain extent the reten-
tion capacity of the system [SRC], the study team reduced
the impact factors to a core set which was taken as basis for
the impact analysis (Table 2).
For the further steps of Formative Scenario Analysis, the
study team decided to retain all the key variables selected
during the second consultation and assessed impact levels for
the key factors (for an overview, see Table 3). On the basis of
the impact matrix (step 4 of FSA) an additional analysis step
consisted in producing the system grid (see Fig. 6), where, as
a consequence of the activity and passivity scores determined
for each key factor, SLIT turned out to play an active role
and VSO a passive role. While PSR had a rather ambivalent
character, and ED was a buffer variable. SSA could not be
assigned to any of the quadrants in the system grid (step 5 of
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Table 2. Impact matrix for case study 1: failure propensity case in an Alpine torrent and possible effects on sediment transport at the
downstream outﬂow cross section.
SLIT ED PSR SSA VSO Activity Impact strength Mean activity 5
SLIT 0 2 1 1 2 6 6.00
ED 1 0 1 2 2 6 0.86
PSR 0 1 0 1 2 4 1.00
SSA 0 2 1 0 2 5 1.00
VSO 0 2 1 1 0 4 0.50
Passivity 1 7 4 5 8
Involvement 6 42 16 25 32
Mean passivity
5
Table 3. Deﬁnition of impact levels for each key variable for case study 1: failure propensity case in an Alpine torrent and possible effects
on sediment transport at the downstream outﬂow cross section.
Impact variable Short description Impact levels deﬁned
SLIT Incoming solid transport and liquid discharge
d1
1 Hypo-concentrated sediment transport – SLIT.HYPO
d2
1 Average sediment transport – SLIT.ORD
d3
1 Debris ﬂow – SLIT.DF
ED Erosion/deposition behaviour
d1
2 Erosion propensity – ED↓
d2
2 Equilibrium propensity – ED→
d3
2 Deposition propensity – ED↑
PSR Protection system reliability
d1
3 Failures likely – FL
d2
3 Failures unlikely – FU
SSA Sediment availability in the system
d1
4 Availability high – SSA.H
d2
4 Availability low – SSA.L
VSO Variation of solid outﬂow (sedimentogram)
d1
5 Positive variation – VSO↑
d2
5 No variation – VSO→
d3
5 Negative variation – VSO↓
FSA). A MIC-MAC analysis (step 6 of FSA) was judged to
be not necessary. As a successive step the impact levels for
each impact factor were deﬁned.
Concerning incoming solid transport and liquid discharge
[SLIT], three impact levels capturing the relevant ﬂow pro-
cesses were deﬁned: Low sediment transport rate (below
the local transport capacity) [SLIT.HYPO, d1
1], average sed-
iment transport rate (equals the local transport capacity)
[SLIT.ORD, d2
1], and debris ﬂow [SLIT.DF, d3
1]. The study
team also identiﬁed three impact levels for the ratio between
deposition and erosion [ED]: Low erosion propensity [ED↓,
d1
2], average propensity [ED→, d2
2], and high deposition
propensity [ED↑, d3
2]. The description of the reliability of
the protection system [PSR] was carried out by assigning
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Table 4. Excerpt from the consistency matrix for case study 1: failure propensity case in an Alpine torrent and possible effects on sediment
transport at the downstream outﬂow cross section.
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d1
2 Erosion propensity – ED↓ 0 1 3
d2
2 Equilibrium propensity – ED→ 1 1 1
d3
2 Deposition propensity – ED↑ 3 1 0
PSR
d1
3 Failures likely – FL 0 1 3 3 0 1
d2
3 Failures unlikely – FU 3 1 0 0 1 3
one of the following two impact levels: Failures likely [FL,
d1
3], and failures unlikely [FU, d2
3]. The sediment availabil-
ity of the system [SSA] was described in terms of impact
levels by either a high level of availability [SSA.H, d1
4] or a
low level of availability [SSA.L, d2
4]. The variation of solid
transport [VSO] was identiﬁed by three levels: Positive vari-
ation [VSO↑, d1
5], no variation [VSO→, d2
5] and negative
variation [VSO↓, d3
5].
The scenario construction (step 7 of FSA) consisted in as-
signing the consistency rating for each individual pair of im-
pact levels of different impact variables as follows:
c(·,·) = 3 → Complete consistency, the levels of
the impact factors are coherent and support each other
c(·,·) = 1 → Partial or weak inconsistency
c(·,·) = 0 → Inconsistency
In Table 4, an excerpt of the consistency ratings assigned
to each pair of impact levels of different impact variables
is presented. Subsequently, all possible scenarios were de-
rived (step 7 of FSA). For each possible scenario an additive
consistency value was assigned. Table 5 reports the consis-
tency values for all possible scenarios. While in the ﬁrst
two rows of the table all impact level combinations of the
two impact factors SLIT and ED are reported, the last three
columns report all possible impact level combinations of the
remaining impact factors, VSO, PSR and SSA, respectively.
In order to select the relevant hazard scenarios (step 8 of
FSA), the additive consistency values of all complete scenar-
ios consisting of determined impact levels for each impact
factors were reported at the crossing cell positions of the cor-
responding rows and columns. The most consistent scenarios
are highlighted. The highest consistency value was assigned
to the following two different, and thus possible, scenarios:
(1) VSO↑, PSR.FL, SSA.H, ED↓, SLIT.DF, indicating that
a positive solid outﬂow variation was judged to be consistent
withahighfailurelikelihoodoftheprotectionsystem, alarge
amount of available sediment in the considered torrent reach
characterised by erosion propensity and debris ﬂows; and
(2) VSO↓, PSR.FU, SSA.L, ED↑, SLIT.HYPO, reﬂecting an
opposite situation. As a result of scenario interpretation (step
9 of FSA) particular attention has to be paid in assessing the
possible ﬂow processes at the upstream boundary of the con-
sidered torrent reach. In Table 5 the possibility of different
sediment transport related behaviours that could take place
in the considered torrent reach depending on the inﬂow type
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Table 5. Set of all scenarios (step 7 of FSA) and identiﬁcation of the set of most consistent scenarios (step 8, highlighted) for case study 1:
failure propensity case in an Alpine torrent and possible effects on sediment transport at the downstream outﬂow cross section.
Erosion/deposition ED↓ ED↓ ED↓ ED→ ED→ ED→ ED↑ ED↑ ED↑
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transport and liquid
discharge – SLIT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Variation of solid Protection system Sediment availability
outﬂow – VSO reliability – PSR in the system – SSA
1 13 15 20 10 11 14 14 13 15 VSO ↑ FL SSA.H
2 4 6 11 4 5 8 8 7 9 VSO→ FL SSA.H
3 4 6 11 4 5 8 11 10 12 VSO ↓ FL SSA.H
4 13 14 18 7 7 9 8 6 7 VSO ↑ FL SSA.L
5 7 8 12 4 4 6 5 3 4 VSO→ FL SSA.L
6 10 11 15 7 7 9 11 9 10 VSO ↓ FL SSA.L
7 9 8 10 10 8 8 15 11 10 VSO ↑ FU SSA.H
8 3 2 4 7 5 5 12 8 7 VSO→ FU SSA.H
9 6 5 7 10 8 8 18 14 13 VSO ↓ FU SSA.H
10 11 9 10 9 6 5 10 6 4 VSO ↑ FU SSA.L
11 8 6 7 9 6 5 10 6 4 VSO→ FU SSA.L
12 14 12 13 15 12 11 20 15 13 VSO ↓ FU SSA.L
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Figure 8. Relevant variables for the description of case study 2 
Fig. 7. Pre-selection of possible impact factors or key variables for
case study 2.
(different levels of variable SLIT) and the response in terms
of reliability of the protection system (different levels of vari-
able PSR) are highlighted. The subsequent determination of
hazard zones on the downstream located alluvial fan has to
take into consideration these results of Formative Scenario
Analysis by deﬁning a sufﬁciently broad range of system
loading conditions in terms of liquid and solid inﬂow in order
to capture possible system responses.
4.2 Case study two: woody debris transport induced hazard
scenarios at hydraulic weak points
In full analogy to case investigated in Sect. 4.1 the scope of
the study team, familiar with the test site, was to determine
the factors that could signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the current state
of the case and the associated system dynamics. The experts
identiﬁed ﬁve major preceptors explaining the interaction of
woody debris transport at hydraulic weak points. First of all,
available woody debris, disposed to be transported towards
the considered weak point, was considered to be essential.
A second condition to be met was the existence of the nec-
essary ﬂow conditions since the recruited woody debris can
potentially reach the hydraulic weak point. The ﬂow condi-
tions at the weak point (liquid and woody debris transport)
determined the system loading. The resistance of the con-
ﬁguration of the weak point was deﬁned to be inﬂuenced by
the structural (also geometrical) properties. The preceptor
that incorporates the possible system response mechanisms
to the blocking within the ﬂow section, e.g. the entrapment
of woody debris at a bridge with a certain number of piers,
was called interaction between woody debris and the con-
ﬁguration of the weak point. The subsequent synthesis steps
lead to the identiﬁcation of possible relevant impact variables
that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the current state of the system and
related dynamics (see Fig. 7). The study team recognised
that in case study 2, the selection of the relevant impact
factors was affected by considerable additional criteria, i.e.
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Table 6. Impact matrix case study 2: woody debris transport induced hazard scenarios at hydraulic weak points.
WFI CWP WS RWP WPC Activity Impact strength Mean activity 4.4
WFI 0 1 1 1 2 5 1.25
CWP 2 0 0 2 2 6 1.50
WS 1 0 0 1 2 4 4.00
RWP 0 1 0 0 2 3 0.60
WPC 1 2 0 1 0 4 0.50
Passivity 4 4 1 5 8
Involvement 20 24 4 15 32
Mean passivity
4.4
Table 7. Deﬁnition of the impact levels for each key variable for case study 2: woody debris transport induced hazard scenarios at hydraulic
weak points.
Impact variable Short description Impact levels deﬁned
WFI Wood-ﬂood intensity interaction
d1
1 Intense interaction
d2
1 Moderate interaction
CWP Hydraulic conﬁguration at the weak point
d1
2 Entrapment propensity → likely
d2
2 Entrapment propensity → unlikely
WS Structural properties of wood
d1
3 Long pieces predominant
d2
3 Short pieces predominant
RWP Structural reliability of hydraulic weak point
d1
4 High reliability
d2
4 Low reliability
WPC Possible hazard consequences at weak point
d1
5 Catastrophic effect
d2
5 Hazard increase
d3
5 No variation
uncertainty and importance, that consequently needed to be
taken into account during the sets of calculation. O’Brien
and Dyson (2007) pointed out criteria for selecting the key
factors that will form the structure of the scenarios, i.e. the
level of uncertainty in quantifying impact variables with re-
spect to their future behaviour, and the associated level of
importance of the variable for the system which reﬂects the
signiﬁcance of the individual factor within the dynamics of
the analysed phenomenon. The expert team estimated the
respective levels of uncertainty and of importance. In Fig. 8
the levels of uncertainty are plotted versus the levels of im-
portance. The study team deﬁned the region of signiﬁcance
by (1) minimum level of uncertainty, Umin≥2, and (2) mini-
mum level of importance Imin≥2. As a result, the variables
structural properties of wood [WS], reliability of hydraulic
weak point [RWP], wood-ﬂood interaction intensity [WFI],
and possible hazard consequences at the location of the weak
point [WPC] were judged by the study team to be signiﬁcant
variables for the description of the system.
The relevance of variable hydraulic conﬁguration at the
weak point [CWP] was reconsidered (the level of impor-
tance was very high), and the variables area of wood-ﬂood
interaction [AWF], ﬂood event intensity [FI], and availability
of woody debris along the torrent [WE] were partially
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Fig. 8. Relevant variables for the description of case study 2.
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Fig. 9. Selected key variables for case study 2 after a reconsidera-
tion step.
included in the variable WFI, as shown in Fig. 9. In a sub-
sequent step, the impact matrix for the selected variables
was constructed for the variables CWP, WS, RWP, WFI, and
WPC (see Table 6).
Plotting the levels of activity versus the levels of passiv-
ity/sensitivity of each key variable in a system grid (Fig. 10),
CWP and WFI resulted to be active key variables, there-
fore inﬂuencing the other variables, and RWP and WPC re-
sultedtobesensitiveontheinﬂuenceoftheabove-mentioned
variables. WS was found to be a buffer variable. The
impact levels were assigned to each impact factor as shown
in Table 7. Concerning the interaction between the wood and
the ﬂooding process [WFI], two impact levels were used to
describe the interaction intensity: Intense interaction [d1
1],
and moderate weak interaction [d2
1]. The study team subse-
quently identiﬁed two impact levels for the hydraulic conﬁg-
uration at the weak point [CWP]: Entrapment propensity is
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Figure 9. Selected key variables for case study 2 after a reconsideration step 
 
Fig. 10. System grid of the selected key variables of case study 2.
likely [d1
2], and entrapment propensity is unlikely [d2
2]. The
description of the structural properties of the wood [WS]
was carried out by assigning one of the following two im-
pact levels: Long pieces (deﬁned as those pieces larger than
the channel width available for ﬂow-through) predominant
[d1
3], and short pieces (deﬁned as those pieces smaller than
the channel width available for ﬂow-through) predominant
[d2
3]. The structural reliability of the hydraulic weak point
[RWP] was described in terms of impact levels by either a
high level of reliability [d1
4] or a low level of reliability [d2
4].
The possible hazard consequences at the weak point [WPC]
were identiﬁed by three levels: Catastrophic effect [d1
5], haz-
ard increase [d2
5] and no variation [d3
5].
For the case study presented in Sect. 4.2, the expert team
assigned the consistency rating for each pair of impact levels
of different impact variables (see Table 8).
For each possible scenario an additive consistency value
was assigned. Table 9 reports the consistency values for
all possible scenarios, and the most consistent scenarios are
highlighted.
In Table 9, the additive consistency values for all possible
scenarios are shown. While in the ﬁrst two rows of the ta-
ble all impact level combinations of the two impact factors
CWP and WFI are presented, the last three columns describe
all possible impact level combinations of the remaining im-
pact factors WS, RWP and WPC, respectively. The additive
consistency values of all complete scenarios consisting of
determined impact levels for each impact factors are shown
at the crossing cell positions of the corresponding rows and
columns. The most consistent scenarios are highlighted. The
highest consistency value was assigned to the following two
different, and thus possible, scenarios, with an additive con-
sistency value of 25 and 23, respectively:
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Table 8. Consistency matrix for case 2: woody debris transport induced hazard scenarios at hydraulic weak points.
Impact variable Impact levels deﬁned
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WFI d1
1 Intense interaction
d2
1 Moderate interaction
CWP d1
2 Entrapment propensity → likely 3
d2
2 Entrapment propensity → unlikely 1
WS d1
3 Long pieces predominant 3 3 1
d2
3 Short pieces predominant 1 1 3
RWP d1
4 High reliability 1 0 1 1 0
d2
4 Low reliability 3 1 0 0 1
WPC d1
5 Catastrophic effect – ↑↑↑ 1 3 0 1 0 0 1
d2
5 Hazard increase – ↑ 3 3 0 3 1 1 3
d3
5 No variation – → 0 0 3 0 1 3 1
1. CWP – likely, WFI – intense, WS – long pieces, RWP
– low reliability, WPC – hazard increase, indicating that
a hazard increase at the weak point was judged to be
consistent with a weak point conﬁguration where en-
trapment of woody debris is likely, given that an intense
wood-ﬂood interaction takes place, the structural relia-
bility (e.g. at a bridge location) is low and long pieces
are involved in woody debris transport.
2. CWP – unlikely, WFI – weak, WS – short pieces, RWP
– high reliability, WPC – no variation, reﬂecting an
opposite situation. This is a clear indication that par-
ticular attention has to be paid either to the assessment
of the structural properties of the wood (large or small
pieces of woody debris) or to the structural and reliabil-
ity characteristics of the weak point conﬁguration (fail-
ures and likelihood of entrapment).
In Table 9 other possible and consistent future states for the
case study are also highlighted, depending on the levels as-
sumedfortheimpactvariables. Thescenarioinvolvingcatas-
trophic effects at the weak point has also to be taken into
consideration (relatively high additive consistency value).
Within the hazard mapping procedure and in particular when
performing the hydrodynamic simulations the set of model
scenarios should correctly reﬂect the weak point system be-
haviour. The results of Formative Scenario Analysis are rele-
vant in order to consider a sufﬁciently broad range of hydro-
dynamic simulations and capture possible system responses.
By redesigning the weak point conﬁguration, decreasing the
likelihood of obstruction through woody debris and increas-
ing the structural reliability, an important step towards efﬁ-
cient hazard mitigation could be achieved.
5 Conclusions
By adopting the Formative Scenario Analysis framework the
study team analysed relevant issues in hazard analysis es-
sential for a comprehensive risk assessment procedure. The
underlying case studies were presented in Sects. 4.1 and
4.2 accordingly. The expert knowledge available in the dif-
ferent domains was successfully integrated by interaction
and collaboration of the study team through a guided sce-
nario building and a rigorous scenario selection procedure.
Throughout the entire process of hazard assessment and
mapping the identiﬁcation of consistent assumptions either
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Table 9. Set of all scenarios (step 7 of FSA) and identiﬁcation of the set of most consistent scenarios (step 8, highlighted) for case study 2:
woody debris transport induced hazard scenarios at hydraulic weak points.
Entrapment propensity – Likely Likely Unlikely Unlikely
CWP →
Wood-ﬂood interaction – Intense Light Intense Light
WFI →
1 2 3 4 Wood Structural WPC
structure reliability
– WS – RWP
1 16 13 10 11 Long pieces High reliability Catastrophic effect – ↑↑↑
2 21 17 15 15 Long pieces High reliability Hazard increase – ↑
3 14 15 14 19 Long pieces High reliability No variation – →
4 19 12 11 8 Long pieces Low reliability Catastrophic effect – ↑↑↑
5 25 17 17 13 Long pieces Low reliability Hazard increase – ↑
6 14 11 12 13 Long pieces Low reliability No variation – →
7 10 11 8 13 Short pieces High reliability Catastrophic effect – ↑↑↑
8 14 14 12 16 Short pieces High reliability Hazard increase – ↑
9 10 15 14 23 Short pieces High reliability No variation – →
10 15 12 11 12 Short pieces Low reliability Catastrophic effect – ↑↑↑
11 20 16 16 16 Short pieces Low reliability Hazard increase – ↑
12 12 13 14 19 Short pieces Low reliability No variation – →
concerning system loading or system response mechanisms
provided crucial insights into the systems behaviour. It had
beenshownthatpossiblecasedevelopmentscanbedescribed
with a particular focus on feedback loops (reliability of the
protection measures vs. sediment availability) and nonlin-
ear cause-effect chains (transported woody debris vs. entrap-
ment propensity at hydraulic weak point locations). As a
consequence, it was possible to better describe the relative
importance and uncertainty of each impact factor. The struc-
tured decomposition of the case by a series of preceptors, fol-
lowed by a knowledge integrating synthesis efﬁciently sup-
ported the control of coherence and traceability of the results
(as required during hazard mapping) and the informed deci-
sion making process (as required for an efﬁcient prioritisa-
tion of mitigation strategies).
The two case studies performed in this work put into evi-
dence that a small set of consistent and reliable exploratory
scenarios to identify effects given a speciﬁc set of causes
have to be taken into account. One of the crucial chal-
lenges of integral risk management is to be prepared for
the unexpected. If weak signals of an unexpected future
are not discerned by deterministic models, or probabilistic
models neglect important facets of the case, the possibility-
based approach of Formative Scenario Analysis offers appar-
ent problem-solving advantages.
By meeting basic and operational principles (Shepard,
2005), Formative Scenario Analysis can provide remarkable
insights in the entire process of hazard assessment, inte-
grating, where necessary, consistent assumptions either con-
cerning system loading or system response mechanisms or
boundinguncertaintieswherepossible. However, themethod
has to be used in combination with hydrological and hy-
draulic simulation models in order to produce consistent,
fully intelligible and retraceable results. It is therefore also
of considerable importance to capture at least qualitatively
the different facets of multi-hazard situations and nonlinear-
ity in cause-effect relationships in order to design resilient
protection systems.
The interaction necessary for Formative Scenario Analysis
requires participation within the study team; i.e. with respect
to reveal tacit and mental assumptions of the team members
or with respect to promote organisational learning aspects
(e.g., the use of a common language).
In particular concerning the European Flood Risk Di-
rective (Commission of the European Communities, 2007),
but also with respect to the overall aim of building hazard-
resilient communities, future studies should include the ap-
plicability of Formative Scenario Analysis within ﬂood risk
management plans. Since such plans are of certain relevance
in order to deal pro-actively and from an ex-ante perspective
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with ﬂooding hazards including torrent processes, the appli-
cability in the framework of ﬂood risk management plans is
obvious. Aparticularfocusshouldbeplacedonthecombina-
tion between participative effects such as Formative Scenario
Analyses and conventional modelling approaches in order to
better achieve the overall aim of managing natural hazard
risk in a sustainable manner.
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